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Creative Differences: Indigenous Artists 
and the Law at 20th Century Nation-
Building Exhibitions 
LUCAS LIXINSKI* AND STEPHEN YOUNG** 
ABSTRACT 
Indigenous peoples in major common law jurisdictions (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) have had a fraught 
relationship with the state’s legal system. However, while denying 
Indigenous individuals and peoples the same rights as white settlers, each 
of these states used Indigenous art to create a distinctive national-state 
identity. We analyze four major exhibitions, one from each of these 
countries to de-naturalize legal institutions responsible for the oppression 
of Indigenous people. This agenda-setting, comparative legal analysis 
yields valuable insights for the regulation of the contemporary Indigenous 
art market, and to understand how culture makes legal personality. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Throughout most of the 20th century, Indigenous peoples in major 
common law jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States) have had complex if not fraught relationships to each state’s 
legal system.1 At various times, these states did not recognize Indigenous 
individuals and peoples as having access to the same rights as white 
settlers. And yet, as we explore here, Indigenous art played a role in state-
building and the cultivation of distinctive national-state identities. We 
examine four international exhibitions, which were used to showcase the 
distinctive art as ‘belonging to’ the nation-state and, in doing so, suggest 
plausible narratives of distinct national identities. As we explore here, there 
were key tensions with showcasing these arts. These exhibitions, in their 
promotion and co-option of Indigenous art for national identity-building 
produced questions about the identification of rights holders and the 
originality of Indigenous art as “art” that influenced broader debates about 
the legal recognition of Indigenous peoples in those four countries. 
The international and comparative regulation of Indigenous art is a 
fruitful yet un(der)explored space where Indigenous identities, recognition, 
and rights are negotiated, often through background norms.2 Critical 
(international) legal scholars have sought to articulate the importance of 
background norms through the interrelation of public international law to 
private law.3 In articulating the ‘background norms’, they target a ‘common 
sense’ approach to law and the market. This common-sense approach 
maintains the idea that, broadly, government is man-made and the market is 
natural and spontaneous order of human exchange.4 For critical legal 
scholars, that view obscures multiple debates and issues worth 
interrogating, which is why they seek to bring the ‘background norms’ to 
the foreground.5 Where some believe that the market is a naturally and 
spontaneously occurring phenomenon and that law or international law 
 
 1. Kristy Gover, Settler–State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 26 (2) EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 345 (2015). 
 2. Terri Janke & R Quiggin, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property: The Main 
Issues for the Indigenous Arts Industry in 2006, ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER 
ARTS BOARD, AUSTRALIA COUNCIL (2006). 
 3. David W. Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 
TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 370-72 (1994). 
 4. Id. at 372. 
 5. Alan Audi, A Semiotics of Cultural Property Argument, 14 INT’L J. CULTURAL 
PROP. 131 (2007). For non-art related context that reads legality into the creation of markets 
(and its crises), see ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-123 (Cambridge University Press 
2003).  
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must catch-up to constrain its excesses,6 that style of narration obscures the 
legal processes in creating the conditions, contingencies, and social 
relations of the market.7 Accordingly, the supposed ‘excesses’ of the 
marketplace are part and parcel of that legal construction.  
Narrative styles that maintain and reproduce these background norms 
do important work in shaping the realm of possibilities for broader 
recognition efforts through law. We take the regulation of Indigenous art 
seriously not only to understand the background norms and stakes of 
recognition, but also to better appreciate the interlinking of law with 
economic domains that are manifested in the art market. More specifically, 
our analysis shows that state-based legal regulation of Indigenous art has 
never been static. The legal regulations of and for Indigenous art became 
more important as states emerged from empire and formalized themselves 
to extend their own territories and boundaries. Similarly, the categorization 
of objects that are considered ‘art’ is flexible and dynamic. At first, 
Indigenous or ‘native’ objects were categorized as something other than 
‘art’, but they were important and useful in forming national identities in 
support of the formalizations of the nation-state. As states emerged from 
colonies and through domains, classification involved (re)producing the 
category of art as applicable to Indigenous objects. The increasing 
formalization of state law then discursively produces the background norms 
for commodification of these art-objects as well as identities, in terms of 
claims to an ‘authentic self’ and national-identities for the nation-state and 
Indigenous nations.  
We argue that the formalization of state boundaries reveals that 
employing legal frameworks for directly addressing and protecting 
Indigenous artists and art will continue to be dynamic, fraught, contested 
and limiting. Turning to national and international legal regimes to contain 
the so-called excesses of the marketplace maintains and reproduces a 
narrative style about background norms while it produces debates and 
contests, including: whether Indigenous objects are art or artefact, 
recognized or assimilated, dependent on state patronage versus exercising 
self-determination, or pathways to identity, capacity and rights. Rather than 
solve or fix these issues, legal regimes narrow the field of contestation to 
legitimate discourses that perpetuate background norms, so this winnowed 
 
 6. Neoliberals, like Friedrich A. von Hayek advocated for spontaneous ordering and 
market-based freedoms that required and depended on rights and the rule of law. See 
JESSICA WHYTE, THE MORALS OF THE MARKET: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RISE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM, 19-203 (2019); see also FREDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND 
LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 35-54 (1998).  
 7. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 372.  
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range of debates remain contested. Those legal contests, however, are 
valuable. They produce the opportunities for more legal claims, claims to 
authenticity, identity, and nation as well as a range of economic 
opportunities and they obscure any debate about the role of legality in 
constructing the market and those problems.  
We make this argument through examining four major exhibitions, 
one in each of these four common law countries: the 1906 New Zealand 
International Exhibition in Christchurch, which curated the notion of 
‘Maoriland’ that combined the Pākehā (non-Māori, white, person) salvage 
mentality and a genuine Māori concern to preserve and maintain their 
cultural heritage; the 1927 Exposition d’Art Canadienne at the Jeu de 
Palme Museum in Paris, which highlighted the incongruousness of legally 
protecting art and artists in contexts where cultural practices were 
otherwise legally forbidden; the 1939 San Francisco World’s Fair, which 
promoted Indian Arts to demonstrate Indian economic independence as a 
marker of their civilization; and the 1988 touring exhibition Dreamings: 
The Art of Aboriginal Australia that cemented domestic recognition efforts 
through appeals to international audiences and international legal discourse.  
This is an agenda-setting article: additional research is needed because 
the case studies only offer snapshots of imperial workings and 
reproduction. The exhibitions on which we focus happened at different 
times over the course of the 20th century, meaning we need to deal not only 
with different countries, but also different moments in the international 
Indigenous movement, and different points of the state of the art with 
respect to scientific racism and colonialism. As a result, our account is 
more comparable to vignettes than a fully realized linear narrative. That is a 
fair possible objection to this article. 
Nonetheless, we deal with this objection by accounting for those 
differences in discourse to highlight different modes of engagement while 
resisting linear narratives of progress.8 That is also a reason why we 
structure our discussion of these exhibitions in chronological order. 
Further, these snapshots enable a much more comprehensive sense of the 
direction of legal argument on Indigenous rights seen through the 
perspective of Indigenous art than would otherwise be possible. 
Further, and vitally, we are both non-Indigenous scholars, meaning 
our positioning in the discussion of these themes is complicated by our own 
 
 8. We highlight the role of a linear narrative of progress, but not for the purposes of 
supporting it. For a discussion of the role of these narratives in legal argument, see Tilmann 
Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress Constructed in International Legal 
Scholarship?, 25(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 425 (2014). 
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non-Indigenous (and settler colonial) positionalities.9 Nevertheless, our 
position as insiders to the colonial legal order we seek to critique and 
unravel is also useful for understanding and articulating the role of law, and 
we do not seek to replace Indigenous voices and claims with our own. 
Instead, we wish to bring background norms forward to scrutinize ongoing 
colonial formations, which is necessary for Indigenous peoples to better 
position their own legalities. 
Despite these limitations, this article offers significant benefits that 
might not be otherwise attainable. Our comparative historical and legal 
analysis de-naturalizes legal institutions responsible for the oppression of 
Indigenous peoples. Further, our comparison of these four jurisdictions 
fosters legal innovation by yielding valuable insights for the regulation of 
the contemporary (Indigenous) art market, as well as for understanding 
how culture (and cultural history with it) is interrelated to the making of 
legal personality, which continue to be contested grounds for rights 
recognition battles.10 However, we ultimately conclude that further research 
in this area is warranted, especially research attentive to international and 
comparative colonial legalities. 
We intervene in comparative law more broadly by de-localizing 
settler-Indigenous experiences.11 While a common assumption, particularly 
connected to certain readings of cultural anthropology, is that experiences 
are unique, culturally contingent, and we should not be too quick to 
generalize them,12 a comparative analysis provides a broader vantage point, 
especially for understanding the role of law and legality as processes of 
abstraction.13 That is to say, we seek to draw attention to the processes of 
legal abstraction arising from background norms that would be occluded, 
obfuscated or ignored in detailed analysis of a singular, particular and 
localized account. When it comes to the settler states we examine, each 
state derived from a British colonial project which engaged with 
 
 9. For a discussion of positionality, see Celina Carter et al., Explicating Positionality: 
A Journey of Dialogical and Reflexive Storytelling, INT’L J. QUALITATIVE METHODS 362 
(2014). 
 10. JONAS BENS, THE INDIGENOUS PARADOX: RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CULTURE IN 
THE AMERICAS (2020); see generally STEPHEN YOUNG, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CONSENT AND 
RIGHTS: TROUBLING SUBJECTS (2020). 
 11. For a recent example of this type of intervention in history, see Jane Carey & Ben 
Silverstein, Thinking With and Beyond Settler Colonial Studies: New Histories after the 
Postcolonial, 23 POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 1 (2020). 
 12. This discussion dates to the origins of cultural anthropology. For a recent account, 
see CHARLES KING, THE REINVENTION OF HUMANITY: HOW A CIRCLE OF RENEGADE 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS REMADE RACE, SEX AND GENDER (2020). 
 13. Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: 
A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986). 
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Indigenous peoples based on the same premise – the want to expand of 
empire. However, colonialists engaged with Indigenous peoples in different 
places and times and faced local differences and resistances.14 Second, 
Indigenous movements are themselves internationalized, meaning they 
often share strategies across national boundaries.15 Finally, the scientific 
racism against which these internationalized Indigenous rights movements 
operate does not respect national boundaries nor cultural specificities of 
Indigenous peoples, responding instead to colonial projects and discourses 
that are far more internationalized.16 We do not mean to engage with these 
issues only from the perspective of colonial law and categories, of course, 
or to applaud colonialism or de-emphasize resistance. Instead, we seek to 
draw further attention to the background norms against which Indigenous 
recognition, especially through law, operates. In other words, we speak of 
the localized operation of recognition efforts against colonial structures that 
were becoming globalized, and there is thus much to be gained from 
learning and borrowing strategies from different contexts. 
The article proceeds as follows: the next section provides four 
snapshots of exhibitions, using those events to query the basic legal 
categories. Based on those snapshots, section three pulls together the 
analytical threads that arise from our analysis of these exhibitions to 
indicate the potentials of a broader research agenda on the regulation of 
Indigenous art. We conclude with a call for additional research in this area. 
II. INDIGENOUS ART AND THE (UN)MAKING OF RIGHTS HOLDERS  
A. NEW ZEALAND 1906: WHITE SALVAGE AND INDIGENOUS 
PRESERVATION  
At the Christchurch International Exhibition 1906-07, the New 
Zealand government funded the creation of a Māori model pā. This pā, 
named Araiteuru, was a life-size replica of a Māori “stockaded village of 
the olden times” that was constructed specifically for the Exhibition.17 
 
 14. STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS, AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLE FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA, 455 (2007). 
 15. KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, 
CULTURE, STRATEGY (Duke University Press) (2010). 
 16. KING, supra note 12. 
 17. J. COWAN, OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION OF 
ARTS AND INDUSTRIES HELD AT CHRISTCHURCH, 1906-07: A DESCRIPTIVE AND HISTORICAL 
ACCOUNT 310 (John Mackay, Government Printer (1910). See also, Simonccl, 110 years 
ago: The 1906 New Zealand International Exhibition (Nov. 2, 2016) 
https://my.christchurchcitylibraries.com/blogs/post/110-years-ago-the-1906-new-zealand-
international-exhibition/. 
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Within this ersatz village, Māori were exhibited, and they exhibited 
themselves, to an imperial or colonial gaze. They showcased their skills, 
talents, and taonga (anything prized including socially and culturally 
valuable objects, resources, phenomenon, ideas, and techniques). Through 
bodily acts and displaying taonga, they performed in ways that did not 
always conform to colonial expectations. These skillful performances and 
acts of display arrived at a time and place that helped cultivate broader 
appreciation for Māori art as art. It also helped Aotearoa New Zealand 
forge a distinct national identity within the British Empire through the 
promotion of a romanticized and mythic place, ‘Maoriland’.  
This exhibition reveals an interlinking of empires, identities, 
authenticity, and market. At the beginning of the 20th century, New Zealand 
was a British colony. The staging of the Christchurch International 
Exhibition 1906-07 reflects that colonial status in an ambiguous way. At 
one level, the New Zealand government staged the Exhibition to forge a 
distinct national identity as it transitioned from colony to self-governing 
dominion, while at the same time claiming the moniker “Britain of the 
South” and announcing fealty to Empire and Britishness.18 At another, 
Māori staged themselves, as others staged them, within the Exhibition in 
ways that demonstrate similar tensions of independence and fealty, 
particularly around promoting distinctive (national) identity within “the 
kingdom under the mana (prestige, reputation, authority, power) of which 
we live.”19 Māori and Pākehā promoted these identities by establishing 
their material progress, advancement and industriousness as part of a 
civilizing narrative.20 In relation to the rest of the Exhibition, Araiteuru 
promoted a vision of ‘Maoriland’ so Māori and Pākehā could stage distinct 
national identities. 
The Exhibition’s Main Building was dedicated to the products of the 
British Empire. Within it, as an example, Auckland displayed former 
colonial governor and premier Sir George Grey’s “large collection of 
Maori artefacts.”21 They were not displayed as art. As a reflection of 
 
 18. Jock Phillips, Exhibiting Ourselves: The Exhibition and National Identity, 
FAREWELL COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CHRISTCHURCH, 
1906-07 21-2 (John M. Thomson ed., 1998); Bernard Kernot, Imaging the Nation: The New 
Zealand International Exhibition 1906-07 and the Model Maori Pa, ART AND 
PERFORMANCE IN OCEANIA 37 (Barry Craig, Bernard Kernot and Christopher Anderson eds., 
1999). 
 19. Margaret Orbell, Maori writing about the Exhibition, FAREWELL COLONIALISM, 148, 
citing Te Pīpīwharauroa no. 104 (November 1906).  
 20. Phillips, supra note 18. 
 21. Gavin McLean, The Colony Commodified: Trade, Progress and the Real Business 
of Exhibitions, FAREWELL COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION 
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Empire, the Art Gallery connected to the Main Building housed the British 
Art Exhibit, excluding Māori art. The exhibition was commercially 
unsuccessful (it lost money), but it was symbolically important and 
materially impactful in leaving “its mark on most of our [New Zealand’s] 
public collections,”22 underscoring a division between European settler and 
Indigenous forms of art production. 
After 1900, the economic engine of international exhibitions was not 
education, commerce or propaganda – it was entertainment and 
consumption.23 The Exhibition’s entertainment included a “Wonderland,” 
with its “Space ship”; the country’s first water-chute; the “Katzejammer 
Castle”; and a 375-foot long cyclorama of the “Battle of Gettysburg.”24 
Directly next to this ‘fun-fair’ was Araiteuru, part of the ‘amusements’.25 
This ‘entertainment’ feature helped solidify the notion that Māori produced 
art in sophisticated ways that were, importantly, authentic and proof of 
being recognized as civilized.  
The idea for Araiteuru was imported from the United States. Secretary 
of the Department of Tourist and Health Reports, T.E. Donne convinced 
the New Zealand Government to construct a model Māori pā after viewing 
the model villages of Native American tribes and Filipino Islanders at the 
1904 St Louis World’s Fair.26 The St Louis World’s Fair displayed model 
villages of the tribes within the US’s growing empire along a scale of low 
to high civilization that supposedly demonstrated a social Darwinist 
evolution of historical progress.27 By contrast, Araiteuru, presented 
romanticized “colonial images of a mythic Maoriland.”28 That was not 
because Māori or Pākehā disagreed with this civilizational narrative, but 
both Māori and Pākehā involved in constructing Araiteuru saw Māori as 
relatively high on the civilizations scale.29 If old and backwards 
superstitions were dying out, that was welcomed.30 Māori, however, were 
 
CHRISTCHURCH, supra note 18, at 33. 
 22. Linda Tyler, Art For Empire: Paintings in the British Art Exhibit, FAREWELL 
COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CHRISTCHURCH, supra note 
18, at 104. 
 23. A Māori visitor of the exhibition, Reweti Kohere noted the ‘fine’ pā but identified 
the entertainment and educational features. Orbell, supra note 19, at 149-60. 
 24. McLean, supra note 21, at 32-3.  
 25. Phillips, supra note 18, at 23; Cowan, supra note 17, at 5. 
 26. Kernot, supra note 18, at 38.  
 27. Id., at 39. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Banner, supra note 14; see also MPK Sorrenson, How to Civilize Savages: Some 
‘Answers’ from Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, 9(2) N.Z. J. HIST. 97 (1975).  
 30. NEW ZEALAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT 133 (1908). 
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becoming modern civilized. Having identified the category of ‘art’ as 
important civilizational marker, Māori could revitalize those traditions to 
establish that their civilizational credentials.  
The New Zealand Government funded Araiteuru and placed it under 
the management of the Minister for Native Affairs James Carroll (Timi 
Kara of Ngāti Kahungunu) and a “Maori Committee.”31 Caroll appointed 
Augustus Hamilton as Māori Committee leader, two Pākehā and two Māori 
members, Sir Peter Buck and Henry Uru.32 Despite the Committee’s 
oversight, Pākehā intellectuals interested in ethnography managed the 
construction and design of the pā to “convey the semi-barbaric life and 
colour that the builders imagined Pa life to have been.”33 As a fantastical 
re-imagination of pre-colonial Māori life, it was a representation of 
‘Maoriland’ that combined “a display of Māori taonga as well as Pakeha 
salvage.”34 This fictionalized Maoriland supported the notion that Aotearoa 
New Zealand was a land of opportunity, industry and harmonious 
relationships between British and Māori. Although not within the Main 
Building, Araiteuru was centrally important to Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
burgeoning national identity.  
For some, Pākehā saw Araiteuru, and Maoriland more broadly, as an 
imperial appropriation of Māori cultural materials to help “ameliorate a 
sense of alienation from a lost motherland” and “build a local literary 
tradition and a sense of national identity.”35 Kernot writes that Maoriland 
was “both a romanticized world of the European imagination and an 
acknowledgement of their own cultural displacement in an alien place, 
coupled with the recognition of the Maori presence as being the more 
authentic.”36 Pākehā of that time promoted and exploited Māori images to 
support the notion of assimilation into the British Empire. This colonial 
 
 31. Kernot, supra note 18, at 39. Please note that we have updated spelling of proper 
nouns to reflect current use of macrons but preserve original spelling and lack of macrons 
within quotations.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Kernot, supra note 18, at 39 (citing Cowan, supra note 17, at 312). 
 34. CONAL MCCARTHY, EXHIBITING MĀORI: A HISTORY OF COLONIAL CULTURES OF 
DISPLAY 59 (2007).  
 35. Bernard Kernot, Maoriland Metaphors and the Modern Pa, FAREWELL 
COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION, CHRISTCHURCH, supra note 
18, at 61-2 (1998); (citing Jock Phillips, Musing in Maoriland – or was there a Bulletin 
school in New Zealand?) 20 AUSTL. HIST. STUD. 520, 528 (1983); ROGER NEICH, JACOBI 
WILLIAM HEBERLEY OF WELLINGTON: A MAORI CARVER IN A CHANGED WORLD’, 69, 144 
(Records Of The Auckland Institute And Museum, 1991). 
 36. Kernot, supra, note 18, at 63; Conal McCarthy “Our Works of Ancient Times”: 
History, Colonization, and Agency at the 1906-7 New Zealand International Exhibition, 2 
MUSEUM HIST. J. 119, 137 (2009). 
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double-movement creates distinctiveness and difference (exclusion) for the 
purposes of inclusion and assimilation through sameness. The construction 
of a distinctive national identity, perhaps in tension with empire, shows the 
importance of New Zealand and Māori assimilation and progress for 
Empire. Part of this project was to promote and exhibit Māori imagery, 
skills, and their ‘authenticity’ as worthy of being art. As McCarthy argues, 
Māori did not have a word for art, but through this Exhibition and others 
like it “Māori “art” was produced through the colonial culture of display.”37 
Objects that Māori highly valued were promoted and accepted within the 
imperial categorization of ‘art,’ which those constructing Araiteuru 
promoted. 
For instance, before leading the Māori Committee for Araiteuru, 
August Hamilton published articles from 1896 to 1900 that were compiled 
into a book called Māori Art. He was the “best known Pakeha advocate of 
the artistic qualities of Māori culture.”38 He became director of the Colonial 
Museum in 1903 and “launched a concerted buying campaign” to display 
Māori art. He publicly recommended that the basic patterns of “Maori 
decorative art” be applied to architecture and everyday objects so that it 
became “a national characteristic” and a “memorial to the race who created 
and developed it.”39 Hamilton saw Araiteuru as a means of furthering this 
national identity by cultivated broad and imperial appreciation of Māori art 
as art. Accordingly, some criticize Hamilton for using Māori for his own 
ends, while others argue that he was also “used by Māori” and “his work 
indisputably earned him respect of Māori.”40  
Māori used the Exhibition as “an opportunity to enhance their mana 
and define a place for themselves within the colonial order.”41 McCarthy 
writes that Māori “participated enthusiastically” in the creation of and life 
within the pā.42 McCarthy reveals some contemporary effects of a colonial 
double-movement: where the colonized subject’s agency is acknowledged 
they can be identified as “enthusiastically” participating in acts that 
contribute to empire-building (even if it is to advance their own purposes), 
while highlighting the structural imposition of imperialism would undercut 
their agency.  
 
 37. McCarthy, supra note 34, at 46. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 46-7 (citing ANX TO 1, 1901 162/20 (1901)).  
 40. Conal McCarthy, Before “Te Maori”: A revolution deconstructed, MUSEUM 
REVOLUTIONS: HOW MUSEUMS CHANGE AND ARE CHANGED, 129 (Simon Knell et al., eds., 
2007).  
 41. McCarthy, supra note 36, at 125. 
 42. Id. at 126, 130-32. 
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While Pākehā used Maoriland to overcome alienation, Māori 
approached Araiteuru in a similar way. Life for Māori in Aotearoa New 
Zealand in the early 20th century was “a real world of bitter struggle at the 
center of which was the possession of Maori land.”43 After 1840,44 the 
colonial government began a systematic process of land alienation through 
legal mechanisms.45 These were socially deleterious and economically 
costly acts that dispossessed Māori of land.46 In 1901, New Zealand passed 
laws to protect Māori ‘antiquities’ and created a Department of Tourist and 
Health Resorts, which made New Zealand into “the first nation in the world 
dedicated to the marketing and development of its natural and cultural 
resources.”47 Other laws criminalized Māori healing practices involving 
“superstition,” “supernatural powers,” and “foretelling the future,” which 
also helped allay “Pākehā fears about Māori attempts to claw back some 
political power.”48 Araiteuru became an opportunity to re-establish or 
cultivate a national identity through revitalized, but sterilized, non-
superstitious or non-supernatural cultural practices within this “side show.”  
Māori involved in the construction, carvings, and performances of 
Araiteuru “mounted a spirited cultural revival by redeploying ethnographic 
constructions of their “traditional past.”49 It was also an opportunity for 
“important chiefs who reveled in the opportunity for interchange and 
rivalry” to “discuss issues important to the politics of the day” and “present 
themselves advantageously in an international context.”50 Araiteuru 
contained fantastical aspects, like mock battles, but “rather than living out 
Pakeha ethnographic fantasies, Māori made them a reality by taking 
seriously the artifacts, activities and ceremonies, which Pakeha spectators 
thought were just for show.”51 Māori closed it to the public for private 
functions, lived on the pā, hosted visitors, met with and exchanged 
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genealogical information with Cook Islanders, and revived interest in their 
arts.52 Their arts and performances were made anew, and often they did not 
conform to Hamilton’s visions of Māori traditionalism.  
Araiteuru played a role in forming Aotearoa New Zealand’s national 
identities and Māori arts. The role that it played is a small part of a larger 
story about the multiple interlinking and overlapping trajectories of 
imperialism, civilization, and commodification. In one sense, the idea of 
model villages had been imported from the United States, which had 
become its own empire. Through Araiteuru, the Government of New 
Zealand promoted and cultivated a distinct national identity through the 
assimilation of Māori art, motifs, and bodies within empire. 
Simultaneously, the formation of Araiteuru enabled Māori to work with 
Pākehā and within Government to revitalize their arts and projects and 
connect with Cook Islanders and others within the empire.  
Being simultaneously in the exhibition and (co-)managing it meant 
that Māori had some control over how they were displayed. This level of 
agency, albeit key in both narrational and regulatory engagements with 
Indigenous art and artists, was not available to Indigenous artists in other 
contexts. Elsewhere, Indigenous art was meant to serve discrete nation-
making objectives for the benefit of settler colonizers themselves, with 
little regard for Indigenous aspirations. The Canadian example underscores 
the subordination and rejection of Indigenous art when it is framed as more 
than a discrete (yet crucial) point of break with the colonial power. 
B. CANADA 1927: NATIONAL IDENTITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL 
INDIGENOUS ARTS  
In contrast to New Zealand’s engagement with Māori art to cement the 
place of Māori and New Zealand as distinctive identities within Empire, the 
Canadian history of engagement with Indigenous art is marked by 
paternalism, erasure, and the sense of need for direct government support 
and intervention on behalf of First Nations.53 It is also problematic in that 
telling the history of Indigenous art from the perspective of the colonial 
encounter which, while relevant, is not the only nor the key force shaping 
the history of Indigenous art.54 Nonetheless, the colonial encounter is 
important for present purposes because we are telling a history of the 
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regulation of Indigenous art to serve emancipatory goals from colonialism. 
In this account, to create economic pathways, ‘Indian art’ was bound to a 
notion of authenticity that prevented the evolution of Indigenous artistic 
production in artists’ own terms. Despite being a key point of interaction of 
First Nations with the settler-colonial market, there was little to no 
regulation of these transactions and the asymmetries that riddled them (in 
fact, regulation sometimes reinforced these asymmetries). Indeed, most of 
the little attention paid to Indigenous artistic production was not to the 
ways these power relationships operated in the background, but in the uses 
of Indigenous art (as art or ethnography) to forge and promote Canadian 
national identity. 
Against this background, the 1920s was a pivotal moment for the 
formation of Canadian cultural identity. Despite Canada having separated 
from the United Kingdom in 1867, it struggled to find its distinctive voice 
and identity until the period after the First World War.55 The development 
of a native Canadian art scene in the 1920s (particularly through the actions 
of the Group of Seven, modernist painters – who painted pristine and 
Canadian landscapes devoid of Indigenous Canadians) was in full force, 
but it needed to be reconciled with Indigenous art to showcase a clearly 
distinctive cultural and artistic path.56 In 1927, at the Jeu de Paume in Paris, 
Canadian native and Indigenous art were put together in an exhibition on 
the same footing, which praised and validated Indigenous art but was less 
complimentary of the Group of Seven. This exhibition was important as a 
means to underscore the importance and status of Indigenous art alongside 
what settler Canadians assumed was the peak of their cultural achievement. 
However, the differing levels of recognition abroad led to backlash in the 
form of suppression of reviews of the exhibition.57 
The belief that Indians were a “dying race” helped cement and 
stabilize nationalism.58 For the colonial approach, Indigenous art could be 
used to create distinctiveness without necessarily rights to Indigenous 
artists or tribes. Canadian politicians and policy-makers deemed the use of 
Indigenous art, which “show[ed] the Natives as individuals in possession of 
their culture, their regalia, their social structure, their traditions and their 
land,” as dangerous to a nationalistic discourse based on a white 
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narrative.59 Indigenous art was also dangerous in creating an imaginary of 
rights for tribal nations that was incompatible with Canadian domestic law 
and policy at the time, which even forbade a range of Indigenous artistic 
and cultural practices (most notably, the potlatch).60 
In a key review of this 1927 exhibition, a reviewer “unaware that the 
‘Indians’ were at that moment being erased by these very artists from the 
representations of Canada, implied their continued presence as the ancient 
and originary volk from which Canadian culture sprang, rather than their 
disappearance.” They additionally “declared that in using Native art as a 
base, the new Canadian artists had become truly national, citing as a model 
the return among contemporary French artists to the art of the middle ages 
as more truly French. . . .This assertion flew in the face of the assertion that 
the Group [of Seven] sprang from the land without parent, or at most from 
an intimate union of Thomson and nature.”61 
A version of this 1927 exhibition also toured Canadian cities before 
going to Paris. Despite efforts to control the narrative and subsume 
Indigenous art into the narrative of a dying culture that produces 
ethnographic instead of artistic objects, reactions suggested that Indigenous 
art overshadowed the non-Indigenous art. Overall, the exhibition failed in 
most cities where it toured, at least as measured in attendance numbers. 
Critics were really interested in the Indigenous art on display, almost 
entirely dismissing the non-Indigenous pieces.62 In other words, the 
exhibition cemented the importance of Indigenous art for Canadian national 
identity, but in a way different from the instrumental use the government 
expected from it. Crucially, it also fueled the fire of recognition and rights 
to land, culture, and resources. Back in Canada, First Nations leveraged 
these artistic accolades into greater visibility to their claims. 
This exhibition also showcased Indigenous art as “art,” and not 
ethnographic artefacts. However, once back in Canada, museums and other 
cultural institutions returned Indigenous art “to the category of ethnology 
and replaced into the museums where it would remain for the next forty 
years, at least insofar as the country’s national institutions went,” with 
limited collecting of Indigenous art by national institutions for decades.63 
Prior to this 1927 exhibition, however, many First Nations made 
claims to Indigenous art with corresponding effects on legal norms. 
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Indigenous cultural production for consumption by non-Indigenous parties 
was a thriving industry in crafts, which served primarily economic, rather 
than political, objectives. Questions of classification of Indigenous art as 
ethnographic or artistic were secondary to the value of Indigenous cultural 
production as commodities, and a key business for First Nations.64 That 
market for tribal crafts went as far back as the mid-19th century (around the 
time of Canadian independence), reaching an important landmark in 1902, 
with the formation of the Canadian Handicraft Guild.65 In other words, the 
organization of Indigenous art and artists, while having important symbolic 
and political elements (not to mention being a means of practicing culture 
and maintaining it),66 had the operation of a market at its core and should 
not be pushed to the background of recognition claims. The regulation of 
this market is central to making political recognition function beyond any 
declaratory act. 
As Solen Roth put it, “Canada’s colonial history is filled with 
instances of relationships of interdependence going awry, as mutually 
profitable exchanges become exploitation.”67 This exploitation happens 
both through political mechanisms of erasure–like the dying race 
assumption that underpinned the 1927 exhibition–and economic 
asymmetries that are legitimized by legal frameworks that tend to elude 
analyses of the art market. 
The end of the potlatch ban in 1951 highlighted the use of Indigenous 
imagery without Indigenous control, but also opened a door for 
“Indigenous involvement in and control over such marketing strategies. By 
the late twentieth century, the industry had grown considerably. Although it 
was still dominated by non-Indigenous stakeholders, it is around this time 
that it began to see a steady increase in the level of Indigenous participation 
and entrepreneurship.”68 In short, recognition acts are only a relatively 
small part of an emancipatory (or colonial) narrative, with more work being 
possibly done via private law mechanisms. 
Bearing in mind this caveat to the imagined role of recognition, state 
patronage can turn into paternalism and fail to disrupt power asymmetries. 
In Canada, much artistic production happened through arts education in 
residential schools, meant to turn Indigenous persons into lower-class 
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laborer’s producing crafts.69 Civil society pushed for the inclusion of arts 
education and artistic production in schools via a home economics model 
that clearly ran contrary to the assimilationist agenda of the government, 
and thus met with resistance.70 Nevertheless, the well-meaning 
emancipatory goals actually served patronizing and assimilationist ideas 
that worked against Indigenous interests.71 Indigenous artworks were 
framed as belonging to national heritage, rather than the property of 
Indigenous artists themselves, or First Nations.72 
Differently to New Zealand, where Māori art and imagery had a past 
and was becoming the future, Canadians saw Indigenous art as part of their 
nation-making project but did not anticipate or necessitate First Nations in 
the nation’s future. Their erasure was assumed both in the exhibition and in 
the law around Indigenous cultural manifestations and art production. In 
the United States, as we will discuss below, Indigenous art was not part of 
a dying Indigenous past like in Canada. But, while sharing a future-oriented 
use with New Zealand, it was also a very different type of future. The US 
approached Indigenous art as an instrument to advanced assimilation and 
authentic distinctiveness through market-oriented legal instrumentalization.  
C. UNITED STATES 1939: INDIGENOUS ART FROM “CIVILIZATION” TO 
“AUTHENTICITY”  
Much like exhibitions in New Zealand and Canada, the Golden Gate 
International Exposition 1939-1940 in San Francisco, California promoted 
state interests as well as Indian arts. However, there are notable differences 
between the United States and the other settler-states we examine. Like 
Canada, the United States’ (‘US’) used education to separate students from 
families starting in the 1880s, but unlike Canada, the US saw art education 
as an important aspect of assimilation. By 1939, the US adopted a very 
different approach to law and art based upon the assumed predominance of 
the US, as well as an expansion of state-based social welfare programs in 
the wake of the great depression. 
Late 19th Century US legal policy was unabashedly assimilationist. It 
broke up communally-held reservations and transformed them into 
privately-held farms through the Dawes Act.73 Almost simultaneously, it 
mandated state-based childhood education that removed Indian children 
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from reservations.74 The US approached art education as “the foundation of 
morality, a means for the promotion of virtues and of personal and social 
improvement,” and it used art-education to transform “the little ‘savages’ 
into civilized men and women.”75 The art curriculum, however, provided 
Indian pupils with the opportunity to “revive and perpetuate their own 
cultural practices,” which led government officials to “reconsider art 
education policies.”76 Of course, it is a mistake to think that Indians or 
tribes were either passive victims or stalwart opponents of assimilation.77  
In the early 20th Century, the American public thought that Indian 
people “were considered either fully settled into the habits of a civilized 
and productive modern American life, and no longer thought to be ‘Indian,’ 
or, particularly with respect to those still living on reservations, seen as 
unredeemable.”78 By the 1930s, US policies changed as lawmakers 
attempted to reverse the damages created through assimilation.79 
The 1939 Exposition promoted a vision of Indian arts that reflected 
that reversal. No longer “dying or vanishing,” and despite the hardships and 
injustices created by the US for Indian Nations, the 1939 Exposition 
depicted Indians as “vital and dynamic.”80 Reversing assimilation, 
however, intensified legal regulation and commodification of identity and 
authenticity in ways that provided the US with more power over tribes. The 
1939 Exposition was, in many ways, a result of the New Deal. It was also 
marketing for Indian arts and crafts, which promoted the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act 1935 (‘Act’) that was associated with the Indian Reorganization 
Act (called the ‘Indian New Deal’). The Indian Reorganization Act halted 
allotment and restructured tribal governments as constitutional 
democracies.  
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act created the Indian Arts and Craft 
Board (‘Board’) to “promote the economic welfare of Indian tribes and the 
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Indian wards of the Government through the development of Indian arts 
and crafts and the expansion of the market for the production of Indian art 
and craftsmanship.”81 The Board would create trademarks of “genuineness 
and quality for Indian products,”82 as the US obtained prosecution powers 
to criminalize counterfeits and imitations without those trademarks.83 
Given the supposed demand for authentic Indian art and the willingness of 
others to provide fakes,84 the law sought to stabilize Indian ‘authenticity’ so 
that individuals identified as Indian (tribes registered with and 
acknowledged by the US) could produce “authentic” Indian artifacts for the 
consumer market. A Senate Report on the bill noted that “the very 
preservation of these products as expressions of Indian life, or as art, 
depends upon the market and upon bringing an attractive return to the 
maker.”85 
From its inception, the Board was obsessed “with defining and 
marketing the ideology of authenticity,” which defined and equated 
authenticity and “superior quality” with “unbroken links to a primitive 
past.”86 General Manager of the Board Rene d’Harnoncourt claimed that 
“the more isolated the village, the higher the percentage of quality work.”87 
For d’Harnoncourt, the “ever-present link between quality and authentic 
craftsmanship by real Indians – those who were most primitive, least 
corrupted by the modern industrial world – increased an object’s value in 
the high-end market precisely by capitalizing on quality and ethnological 
curiosity.”88 Despite changes in policy and law from assimilation to 
promotion, underlying racial and paternalistic views were not abolished. 
They were transformed.  
Accordingly, this Act has been criticized an example of “salvage 
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paradigm:” an attempt to “rescue ‘authenticity’ out of destructive historical 
change.”89 For Hapiuk,  
“the salvaged objects (or culture itself) that are supposedly saved from 
destruction undergo a process of ossification and reification; removed 
from context, the contingencies of their existence and their past history 
are wiped away. The transformative process creates something quite 
“new” in the appropriator’s culture.”90 
The Exposition promoted Indian arts and crafts to justify the passage 
of the Act and “increase the public’s interest in Indian quality products.”91 
Within the Exposition’s Federal Building, approximately one-third of it, or 
over an acre and quarter, was dedicated to Indian galleries, a marketplace 
and workspace for Indian artists.92 D’Harnoncourt planned and built the 
Indian exhibit to be “like an art museum,” and to “capture the public’s 
attention,”93 which left the public with the impression that Indian arts were 
“a viable genre of art.”94 D’Harnoncourt and Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Commissioner John Collier believed that it would help Indians “earn an 
income from their sale of the products as well as gain confidence. . .and 
self-esteem by working together in a tribal enterprise.”95 
Although Indians “did not participate in the exhibit planning phase or 
in any decision making related to the exhibit,” d’Harnoncourt made them 
visible and they were important behind the scenes.96 Within the exhibit 
“Indian artisans assisted in the execution of the large stylized murals for the 
exhibit halls and after the exhibited opened Indian artists demonstrated 
their skills and gave gallery tours.”97 Indians mostly participated through 
producing arts and crafts for sale at the exhibit.98 Given the new Indian Arts 
and Crafts Act, non-Indian traders were prohibited from selling “Indian” 
arts and crafts, which increased the demand for objects produced by tribal 
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artists while ensuring that d’Harnoncourt’s staff “could control the quality 
and guarantee that the market would be free of imitations.”99 Because the 
galleries displayed Indian arts that were borrowed from US museums, 
d’Harnoncourt made sure that only high quality arts and crafts were sold in 
the market.100 A consequence was that “No attention was paid in this shop 
to the tribal origins of the products, and the articles were arranged in such a 
manner as to make the individual pieces appear at their best.”101 Similarly, 
some of the arts displayed in the galleries were labelled in a “western art 
perspective,” meaning that the labels did not contain cultural information of 
the communities that produced them.102 Other labels “presented intensive 
anthropology lessons.”103 
The Exposition’s Indian market was conceived as “an experimental 
sales and display laboratory,” a “testing grounds for the future 
merchandising of Indian arts and crafts.”104 This experiment in 
marketisation immediately ran aground of US law as well as the problems 
that US law had created for tribes. One problem was that the Board could 
not deal in Indian arts and crafts because the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 
prevented any non-Indian organization from “borrowing, lending, or 
dealing in Indian Artifacts.”105 To get around this limitation, Collier 
solicited cooperation from those tribes to lend pieces for sale on 
consignment at the market.106 This arrangement shifted the burden of 
problem-solving to Indian artists and tribes, which needed financing to 
produce high quality arts and crafts to be sold at the Exposition. Tribes that 
had adopted the Indian Reorganization Act could access credit or apply for 
loans, but others had to seek funding elsewhere.107 While the law had been 
designed to create a market, the market became a means for promoting the 
law to join the market.  
This Exposition shows that by the 1930s, US law made the consumer 
market the primary tool of establishing distinctive identity for Indian 
Nations’ to “claim their rightful place in American society” as it preserved, 
and perhaps ossified, their “authentic” identities. The US sought to promote 
Indian arts and Indian authenticity, as commodified objects within its 
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expanding empire. However, the 1939 Exposition shows that the legal 
commodification of distinct national identities through arts and objects can 
support the empire, and from the US’s perspective, strengthened their 
claims over its subjects. 
After World War II, the language of self-determination arose from an 
anti-colonial, anti-imperial and anti-capitalist movement in international 
law, but would lose much of its anti-imperialist potential after the 1970s.108 
The Australian example below shows the intersection of Indigenous art and 
its legal regulation with the international legal-political language of self-
determination. Accordingly, attempting to use state law, like intellectual 
property, or international legal language, like self-determination, can 
support the (re)formation distinct Indigenous identities or claims to distinct 
national identities. However, doing so is not separate from prior forms of 
imperialism or state formation. Instead, using law to (re)form claims about 
authenticity to regulate the excesses of the international art market is 
consonant with prior legal and formations of market-based imperialism.  
D. AUSTRALIA 1988: INTERNATIONAL PRAISE TO LEVERAGE 
DOMESTIC RECOGNITION  
In the late twentieth century, Australians proactively engaged with 
Indigenous art as part of its national project. Like other countries in our 
analysis, Australia tapped into the power of Indigenous art to create a 
distinctive, post-colonial identity for its white settler population, with 
relatively little benefit planned specifically for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. The recognition of the power and artistic significance of 
Indigenous art outside of Australia, however, lent momentum to Indigenous 
recognition pushes within Australia itself. This momentum worked in the 
direction of quickly individualizing the rights of Indigenous artists and 
grounding them on intellectual property (IP) law, a move that, while 
offering an easily accessible and enforceable rights framework, is made 
less so by many carve-outs for Indigenous culture which render the 
inclusionary potentials of IP law ultimately hollow, counter-productive, or 
exclusionary. 
Indigenous cultural tourism has long been an important part of how 
Australia defined itself to the world, both prior to and especially after the 
1967 referendum that included Indigenous peoples in the Australian legal 
order.109 This initial recognition move lent greater impetus to the 
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exploration of Indigenous art not just as a pre-existing resource for the 
tourist gaze, but also could be produced specifically for the art market. 
Geoffrey Bardon is referred to as a pioneer in engaging with Indigenous 
artists for the benefit of understanding and showcasing Indigenous culture 
and introducing the technique of acrylic painting on canvas that is a staple 
of contemporary Australian Indigenous art.110 Commercial interests soon 
followed, and arguably disrupted the emancipatory potential of Indigenous 
art by setting aside the performance of identity in favor of catering to an 
incipient art market.111 Specifically, artists were accused of no longer 
producing ‘authentic’ Indigenous art and instead catering to consumer 
interests.112 This accusation is, in our view, problematic, inasmuch as it 
encases Indigenous art in an ‘authentic’ realm defined by an outsider 
(Bardon), denying Indigenous peoples their cultural self-determination. It is 
also our contention that claims to self-determination can be problematic for 
ossifying authenticity within a language that is open to re-appropriation and 
contestation. 
Paternalism was a strong theme in the legal treatment of Indigenous 
art from the government’s perspective, even though Indigenous artists 
themselves saw their art as a self-determination move and a means to 
engage with and make sense of colonialism.113 As Fred Myers put it, 
“[a]crylic painting should be reckoned on a continuum or Aboriginal 
productions of culture that we would ultimately understand as forms of 
activism within a multicultural context.”114 
Because self-determination in the 1980s was connected to a politically 
charged struggle for land rights (which were only recognized in 1992),115 
Indigenous art did not enjoy a particularly high status at home. Indigenous 
artists were treated as unskilled laborers,116 and only praise in international 
art centers like Paris and New York seemed to jolt the Australian public 
into awareness of the value of Indigenous art.117 When international 
recognition filtered back into Australia, difficult questions of justice to be 
sidestepped. “Australians felt a sense of cultural ownership with the 
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popularity of Aboriginal art but were reluctant to ask the difficult questions 
about the conditions in which these works were produced.”118 In other 
words, the effect of recognition via the international gaze overlooked issues 
regarding the legal treatment of individual artists. It served the collective 
cause of self-determination well (after all, international recourse is a staple 
of self-determination movements), but it left the legal frameworks affecting 
individual artists (whether as foreground or background norms) unattended. 
Further, the use of Indigenous art for the benefit of the Australian 
nation was, like in other countries, tied to practices of borrowing and 
appropriation by non-Indigenous artists also involved in nation-making 
through the arts. In Australia, modernist painter Margaret Preston called for 
artists to be inspired by Indigenous art practices and adopt Indigenous 
motifs as background in their works. Her calls went unheeded (but not 
rejected) at the time, and later she was nonetheless accused of cultural 
appropriation.119 Despite this backlash, it is clear that “[a]ffirmation and 
appropriation thus went hand in hand.”120 
Against this background, the 1988 touring exhibition Dreamings: The 
Art of Aboriginal Australia generated “excitement surrounding this new art 
market phenomenon, [where] art enthusiasts conscientiously tried to 
unravel the symbolism of Aboriginal art.”121 It was partly led by the South 
Australia Museum in Adelaide and the Aboriginal Commission of 
Australia.122 Like the 1939 San Francisco Exposition discussed in the 
previous section, this exhibition sought to present Indigenous art as 
sophisticated contemporary art, and to dispel assumptions about Indigenous 
art as “primitive,” or of only ethnographic value.123 Indigenous art in this 
exhibition was lauded for being “sophisticated, complex, extremely 
coherent and immensely accurate in its presentation of all that is the 
essence of being Aboriginal,”124 as well as for its “timeless cultural 
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sophistication,”125 and for being “a vital, even avant-garde art.”126 
The exhibition itself, and its accompanying catalogue, were praised 
for being “the first extended overview of the history of Aboriginal art 
scholarship,” “a substantial analysis of the Aboriginal aesthetic which 
reveals how it is integrated with the distinctive world view and social 
values of Aboriginal traditions,” an analysis of “the cultural, economic and 
political contexts of the production of Western Desert paintings for 
Australia and world art markets,” and, crucially, for refuting “the popular 
assumption held by non-Aborigines that Aboriginal culture and society 
would decline rapidly to extinction.”127 The exhibition was also praised for 
being “a milestone for Australian Aboriginal art and a coming-of-age in the 
representation of peoples of color. The recognition of the increasingly 
conspicuous role of native peoples in the domestic control and international 
circulation of their art was the driving force behind this exhibition,” which 
“succeeded in informing of the past and ennobling the future through a 
careful balance of present realities.”128 In other words, this exhibition 
portrayed to the world the artistic achievement of Aboriginal artists, as well 
as claims to self-determination and other rights Aboriginal art and artists 
were politicized through law in ways that other exhibitions did not, a move 
likely possible because the exhibition was held outside of Australia, and 
riding the wave of the Indigenous land rights movement occurring 
domestically and internationally. 
One of the reviews, in the Smithsonian magazine, praised Indigenous 
art’s “persistence of vision [which] is maintained through collective 
enterprise,”129 thus highlighting collective achievements of the artworks 
over individual artists’. At least one other reviewer also criticized the lack 
of individualization of the art and the artists in favor of broader 
contextualization of the artistic tradition.130 In this way, like with other 
exhibitions we analyze here, Dreamings served to galvanize entirety of 
Indigenous art at the expense of the artists. Although the move to broader 
recognition was important in its own terms, it had detrimental impacts on 
the rights of artists, thereby compromising the very art these critics seek to 
elevate. Artists used the art market and Dreamings “to resist the wholesale 
 
 125. Farr, supra note 122, at 84. 
 126. Michael Dirda, DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA, 19 SMITHSONIAN 
183 (Peter Sutton eds., 1988). 
 127. Duncan, supra note 121, at 200. 
 128. Farr, supra note 122, at 84. 
 129. Dirda, supra note 126, at, 200. 
 130. Taylor, supra note 123, at 43. 
28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 45:1 
incorporation of their culture,”131 and therefore the paternalistic assumption 
that they should be excluded from the market, which has direct effects on 
the rights of artists (by assuming they are secondary or should be subject to 
stringent state supervision) needs to be problematized and eliminated in 
regulatory projects. 
Today, Indigenous artists are a much larger proportion of the market 
in Australian art than they are a proportion of the population.132 Because of 
the higher value of Indigenous art compared to proportion of population, 
art is a key economic source for Aboriginal peoples compared to the rest of 
the population.133 That said, Indigenous art does not fetch the same average 
prices as non-Indigenous art at auction.134 While male non-Indigenous 
artists command better prices than women, there is near parity in prices 
across genders with Indigenous art, suggesting that indigeneity eclipses 
gender as a marker of cultural value for buyers.135 The relative over-
representation of Indigenous artists can also lend the impression that the 
1988 exhibition was too successful: it elevated Indigenous art and self-
determination to the point where allegedly no specific or strong legal 
protection is needed. Debates in Australia have focused on resale rights as a 
subset of the artist’s IP rights over their creations, which is an important 
means of leveraging economic benefit in favor of Indigenous artists. That 
said, much discourse in Australia in this area involves “periods of legal 
exclusion and legal inclusion of indigenous art from the ambit of the 
Copyright Act with reference to wider socio-cultural values and political 
developments,” revealing “a double movement [that] characterizes the 
intersection between Australia’s copyright law and wider society: a 
dialogic of inclusion and exclusion. This double movement of inclusion 
and exclusion is dynamic and yet constant in its ultimate withdrawal from 
acknowledging indigenous cultural difference in a meaningful way.”136 
This double movement “can be understood as a movement of inclusion that 
is ultimately undone by its exclusionary elements.”137 
This Australian exhibition, alongside those in Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United States, shine a light on the uses of Indigenous art and 
Indigeneity to pursue nationalist projects, which often occurred without 
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significant regard for Indigenous views and interests. They also show how 
Indigenous peoples have sought to tap into these exhibitions and associated 
legal frameworks to pursue their own causes despite them being objects 
instead of subjects of the law. These exhibitions and the legal contexts 
around them also show that it is not enough to rely on specific legal 
frameworks that directly address Indigenous art. There are myriad 
interactions between Indigenous artists and settler actors in the arts and 
cultural sector that often evade or undermine self-determination or other 
emancipatory efforts. In other words, these exhibitions show that in the 
connections between Indigenous art and their regulation on the one hand, 
and Indigenous goals on the other, the current analytical foci have 
insufficiently grappled with some of the legal mechanisms at work. A 
research agenda is needed to expose the colonial violence, and unearth the 
emancipatory potential, of art and art law in Indigenous contexts. The next 
section offers an articulation and roadmap of such a research agenda. 
III.  BREAKING THE CYCLE? A RESEARCH AGENDA  
Indigenous objects have not always been categorized as ‘art.’ 
However, those objects and images became important and useful in 
forming discrete national identities that supported the formalizations of the 
nation-state. When formalizing boundaries, first as colonies and then as 
states, the state-based legal regime can formally recognize and (re)produce 
the category of art as applicable to Indigenous art-objects. The increasing 
formalization of state law then discursively produces the conditions for 
commodification of these art-objects as well as identities, in terms of 
claims to an ‘authentic self’ and national-identities for the nation-state and 
Indigenous nations.  
Having tapped into the insight of critical legal scholars, the four case 
studies suggest that law–whether private or public, or an international law 
based on common law imperialism–did not lag behind a market for 
Indigenous arts and crafts. It constituted that market as well as national 
identities which, then, discursively shape the law. Therefore, we suggest 
that those who advocate for a turn to national or international legal regimes, 
especially forms of private law–like IP or copyright–for the better 
regulation and promotion of Indigenous artists’ rights will not fully resolve 
the following issues. Instead, (re)turning to law ensures that so-called 
excesses of the marketplace will remain fruitful areas of legal contestation. 
The remainder of this section identifies some of these issues of legality and 
co-production that should animate further necessary research into the 
regulation of Indigenous art. 
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A.  INDIGENOUS PRODUCTIONS AS ART OR ETHNOLOGY  
Indigenous peoples have always prized objects, and some 
anthropologists and lawyers have considered those objects artefacts, not art. 
The Exhibitions demonstrate how that notion has changed. First, Māori 
performances and objects were staged in Araiteuru. Later, Canada placed 
Indigenous arts-objects next to non-Indigenous arts in Canada, and the US 
staged Indian arts like a museum. In the 1980s, the South Australia 
Museum and the Aboriginal Commission of Australia brought Aboriginal 
art to an international audience in support of Indigenous self-determination. 
Through this broad trajectory, art was alienated from the body as law 
became central to authenticity and self-identification. However, tensions 
between art and artefact persist–the exhibitions reveal the need to establish 
Indigenous arts as art in opposition to artefacts. It indicates that even if 
Indigenous peoples had valuable and prized objects, that does not 
necessarily make them “art.” The categorization of art is contentious and 
interdisciplinary tensions among anthropology, law, art history, and 
Indigenous peoples’ views fall short of stabilizing the category.  
For instance, anthropologists and historians have concluded, in 
various ways and according to their disciplines, that “primitive tribes 
decorative art for its own sake does not exist”138 or that “Māori ‘art’ was 
produced through the colonial culture of display.”139 There are, of course, 
counter-claims that these “arts” were not fabricated.140 While those two 
positions might otherwise agree on quite a bit, it is clear that Indigenous or 
native peoples had prized possession and at some later point associated 
with a colonial-project those objects were included within dynamic 
category of “art.” Indigenous art-like objects that pre-date that categorical 
shift, or subsequently produced art-objects in the style of pre-colonial 
categorization become “traditional.” When that occurs, it relates to and 
contributes to discussions about the colonial role in “producing” those 
objects as “traditional.”141 The constitution of these categories then become 
tied up in questions about authenticity. Whether traditions are authentic in 
fact or are “authentic” for the demands of a consumer, and whether those 
are the same thing, is contested.142  
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Here, we note that the more anyone claims to have a “true account,” 
the deeper and more personal the contest seems. Recourse to law, whether 
invoking self-determination as an international legal concept or IP laws of 
state, does not resolve these issues. Instead, law becomes an area for 
contesting claims and disciplinary differences.  
B. RECOGNITION OF PEOPLES  
When it is claimed that colonial contact is what “produces” or 
“invents” “traditions” in opposition to “modernity” (stemming from the 
notion that the category of “art” is externally imposed on Indigenous 
individuals and communities), it inflects what recognition of peoples is or 
might be. Recognition as peoples can have multiple and different 
meanings, but to the degree it stems from international legal claims to self-
determination it holds out the promise that peoples can “freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”143 In each of the case studies, even if the language of “self-
determination” is not used, the state promotes Indigenous art as part of its 
national identity. State promotion can both help and hinder Indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination. If a separate or sui generis legal regime for the 
protection of Indigenous arts were to be created, it might be seen as 
reinforced “(yet again) Indigenous Otherness” but help acknowledge their 
unique position within contemporary state formations.144 A sui generis 
regime could draw attention to the uniqueness of Indigenous ways that 
contribute to greater “respect for Indigenous laws and economic 
principles.”145 It might create conditions for authentic claims to self-
determination.  
In addition to (re)producing conditions for claims to authenticity, non-
Indigenous values might come to influence Indigenous values. An art 
market “is progressively being infused with [Indigenous] approaches to 
property, relationships, and economics that directly reflect the histories and 
cultures of the [Canadian] Northwest Coast’s Indigenous peoples”146 but 
may simultaneously raise “questions of cultural appropriation and 
exploitation, even when it involves willing and active Indigenous 
participants.”147 When questions of appropriation and exploitation are 
viewed as issues related to culture and market, rather than as produced as 
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an issue of and for legal contestation, renewed critical focus on authenticity 
arises.148 Again, the double-movement of colonialism arises: working with 
the state can be viewed as furthering colonialism or assimilationism, while 
highlighting structural dimensions undercuts that agency, an 
inclusionary/exclusionary matrix.  
C. ASSIMILATIONISM  
Some states pursued assimilation through force, like removing 
children from reservations and placing them in white homes. But 
assimilation can be pursued through non-forceful means (assuming a 
distinction between force and non-force, violence and non-violence, or 
coercion and non-coercion). Each exhibition revealed a preconceived 
conceptual distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous or white 
and Indian/Aboriginal/Māori. With those conceptual distinctions, any 
practices or regulation that are exclusionary might be discriminatory while 
inclusionary practices may be assimilative – a double-movement based 
upon an inclusion/exclusion matrix that is itself exclusionary.149 Similarly, 
the binary between authentic and inauthentic or fake presupposes the 
existence of a real and authentic pre-existing identity that could be 
excluded or included and, with the binary, those who are consider not-fully 
authentic fall out of the picture.150 The discourses surrounding authenticity 
produce the struggles for and against authentic art and essentialist 
identities.151  
Art can be the “primary platform” for Indigenous communities to 
present and negotiate identity, which states have also used to cultivate 
national identities.152 States’ intervention in Indigenous artistic production 
raises questions about the state’s appropriation of that identity, which 
within the colonial context re-triggers questions about the “invention” of 
tradition and identity. Throughout appropriation and invention of identities, 
legality is direct implicated. The role of the state as a patron and promoter 
of art showcases the powerful role of the law. But focusing on law as a 
solution to these problems shifts our focus to the subject-matter of law–
legal capacity, individual and collective rights, and so on. Doing so tends to 
ignore the constitutive force of law in producing market, state, and claims 
to national identity and its “Others.”  
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D. STATE PATRONAGE  
State patronage arises when states and state actors play a role in the 
promotion of Indigenous arts. Where the state or state-actors attempt to 
save or “salvage” pre-contact “primitive” art from the ravages of 
modernity,153 it can trigger claims of “invention” of tradition or identity, 
which were reflected through the exhibitions. Hamilton in New Zealand 
and d’Harnoncourt in the United States promoted, respectively, Māori and 
Indian arts to the public and for the public identification. When state actors 
promote, advocate and patron Indigenous artists, scholars–primarily 
anthropologists–have said that those individuals “used” those artists or 
“invented” those traditions.154 That state patronage is not necessarily 
implicated in the same way for non-Indigenous artists reveals an orientalist 
discourse: non-Indigenous artists are the state while Indigenous artists 
belong to the state.  
While state actors have typically promoted Indigenous arts to the 
public and may intend it helping to building nation identities (for the state 
and the tribe), the ability to promote Indigenous artists may rely on or 
contribute to the development of IP laws to facilitate marketization.155 
While one might believe that the IP realm has always existed or pre-existed 
Indigenous artists, the inclusion of Indigenous artists within state legal 
regimes changes the state, its legal regimes as well as the artists. IP for 
Indigenous arts can elucidate previously excluded domains but bringing 
within the ambit of the state as somehow different can also re-assert 
difference as inferiority.156 Assertions of difference affect the state, and in 
fact help create it and Indigenous artists. Where a state promotes 
Indigenous artists, those promotions raise reputations domestically and 
internationally.157 When Indigenous art is closely associated with national 
identity, the promotion of the art can devalue art and artists while 
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enhancing social capital in nationalist identities.158  
E. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP RIGHTS  
When artists represent communally held “traditional cultural 
expressions and knowledge” as art-objects, state-based IP and copyright 
regimes do not adequately deal with the communal or collective nature of 
those rights.159 This gap is often expressed in domestic and international 
law as a tension between individual and collective rights.160 This tension, 
however, applies differently to Indigenous and non-Indigenous artists, in a 
way that “others” Indigenous artistic production and subsumes it into a 
collective paradigm ripe for capture by nation-building projects. 
The common law can apply flexibly to Indigenous contexts. For 
example, judges can apply fiduciary relationships between Indigenous 
artists and the clan or tribal community when there is that relationship.161 
British common law in this sense becomes the mode and method of 
expressing that relationship. Conversely, the framing can also recognize 
that Indigenous normative orders (and laws) can be given effect through the 
common law to recognize Indigenous authority over a work, “irrespective 
of who held the brush.”162 However, that authorship can be ascribed to an 
individual when the piece has been produced collectively is well-
recognized within the “Western” tradition,163 and does not risk negating the 
possibility of legal protection for non-Indigenous artists. In other words, 
non-Indigenous individual authorship over collective works is resolved 
through ascribing a simple individual right, whereas in the Indigenous 
context it is spoken instead in a register of collective rights that is harder to 
enforce. 
Further, when authorship is attributed, it helps makes the object 
“authentic,” giving rise to legal problems when the attribution is false or 
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inauthentic.164 And, as we saw above, authenticity has played a significant 
role in the development of state legal regimes for the regulation and 
promotion of tribal arts and crafts. The battle over “authenticity” suggests, 
however, that focusing on tensions between individual and collective rights 
presupposes a distinction between Indigenous “Others” and national 
identity. It also presupposes that the national identity of the state was 
formed or made without regard for the Indigenous Others. The ability of a 
legal regimes to facilitate individual or collective rights, while keeping that 
distinction relevant, obfuscates that the collective national identity was 
constructed through the inclusion of Others. The use of state-based 
copyright or IP for Indigenous artists then maintains the imperial formation 
of the state, and its civilizing mission, by either shoehorning the “Other” 
into state structures or carving out an exception that purportedly respects 
Indigenous identity, but in order to do so essentializes Indigeneity to the 
point of rendering the law opaque, thereby othering Indigeneity in ways 
that render collective rights meaningless. 
F. CONNECTION BETWEEN INDIGENEITY AND NATIONALISM  
In the exhibitions, states promoted Indigenous authenticity to cultivate 
their own distinct national identities. For instance, in our first example 
about New Zealand, Hamilton sought to memorialize and salvage Māori 
motifs for a national identity.165 Similarly, in Australia Bardon promoted 
Aboriginal artists’ use of acrylics, which became a well-known form of 
Australian Indigenous art.166 We have considered exhibitions because they 
are illustrative of larger trends, hopes and themes. They also reveal that the 
colonies and domains of the British Empire and, later, states relied on 
Indigenous images/motifs to make themselves distinct from the British 
Empire. As they formed distinct identities, they solidified jurisdictional and 
territorial control, which, as the US demonstrates, creates a sense of self 
and responsibility to their own empires.167 Within each of these states 
today, “Indigenous cultural themes are used extensively in tourism 
promotion, for example, and indigenous art has been exhibited and artists 
celebrated internationally.”168 Where distinctive Indigenous artistic images 
aids in the creation of a nation-state identity that is separate from Europe, 
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the formation of national-state identity and the desire for distinctiveness 
can only arise when there is an international ordering, whether an imperial 
formation or an international legal ordering of states. The states remake and 
reproduce empire through the extension of their jurisdictional borders and 
their turn to British common law, as states claim the Other as internal to 
themselves.  
Similarly, the formation and solidification of the national-state identity 
and boundaries can produce a desire amongst Indigenous individuals and 
communities for recognition as distinct from the state–a recognition as 
peoples with self-determination discussed above. In the same way that the 
formation of nation-states requires the establishment and formalization of 
jurisdictional boundaries, Indigenous peoples can uphold their imagery and 
arts to promote distinctive identities as nations. This recognition does not 
deny that many tribes had spatial/temporal claims associated with political 
formations that pre-exist colonial contact. Instead, it points to the formative 
role of law or the international law of self-determination as a new feature in 
(re)creating those boundaries between self and European or self and Other.  
Distinctive Indigenous artistic images can help create a tribal national 
identity that is separate from the nation-state. The formation of a tribal 
national identity and the desire for distinctiveness from the nation-state or 
Europeans can only arise when there is some sort of (inter)national 
ordering. So even if a tribe had pre-colonial claims to land and political 
formations, tribal nations that remake its self-identification in opposition to 
Europe or the nation-state centralize law while reproducing it.  
G. KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND POWER ASYMMETRIES  
Again, Indigenous individuals and communities have always 
possessed prized article and objects. The ability to produce those objects, 
display them and sell them can produce senses of identity as well as 
sources of income. However, Indigenous artists have identified problems 
with the marketplace that are not about identity or market. Instead, 
knowledge created and deployed through colonial-Indigenous encounters 
produced “Indigenous” in opposition to colonists, which made both, 
including “Indigenous” subjects of disciplinary expert knowledge.169 When 
issues arise from the production of knowledge/power, there are reasons to 
believe that invoking a disciplinary knowledge of colonial construction, 
like the state’s legal frameworks, will re-entrench the problems.170 While 
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lawyers and government officials may view the problems of Indigenous 
artists in terms of market failures or a misapplied legal, this way of 
thinking may make it more difficult to recognize broader or foundational 
problems stemming from the colonial production of knowledge as an 
ongoing exercise of power creation.171 As Kathy Bowrey writes, turning to 
national or international IP laws for Indigenous cultural products could  
“and should serve political reconciliation–affirming culture 
and identity and establishing new entitlements of post-colonial 
Indigenous citizenship. What is held out as a political and legal 
possibility is the future development of laws that appropriately 
reflect Indigenous perspectives and cultural identity. This is 
incredibly problematic.”172 
For Bowrey, the legality and the marketplace remains 
un(der)interrogated but central in reproducing discrimination and 
disadvantage.173 Even if a legal regime were to create sui generis rights for 
Indigenous arts, it would (re)produce differences that fail to interrogate 
power dynamics while upholding the status quo and a “range of 
discriminatory practices and burdens that the ‘norm’ is not expected to 
entertain to the same degree.”174 If we are right that law was (at least 
partially) productive of demand for Indigenous arts, and that demand 
discursively constructed the law, then using law to constrain market 
excesses is bound to reproduce the problems that it seeks to solve.  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Understanding Indigenous art through anthropology or law is use of 
knowledge. It works from a way of understanding the world (as already 
abstracted) towards a subject (that is supposedly concrete). We have 
adopted the view that the legal regulation of Indigenous art is a fruitful but 
un(der)explored space–particularly in terms articulating how empire and 
international law are reproduced in terms of national identities and state 
formation. We seek to challenge the notion that law needs to catch up to a 
global market, because law is constitutive of the conditions and 
contingencies of that market. We do not suggest that our inquiry is outside 
of imperial construction; rather, we suggest that legal knowledge is central 
to its reproduction. 
There is a need for additional international and comparative focus on 
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this issue because the formalization of state boundaries reveals that 
employing legal frameworks for directly addressing and protecting 
Indigenous artists or Indigenous art has produced inter-disciplinary debates 
and contests involving many issues discussed here. These debates include 
whether Indigenous objects are art or artefact; the role of art and 
recognition of peoples as opposed to assimilation; the role of state 
patronage in preserving and producing “authenticity;” the legal capacity of 
arts; individual or collective rights, commodification, identity, and 
nationality. We discuss each in short without suggesting that we can or will 
try to solve these debates. Instead, they are evidence of a result of a legal 
regime that ensures these issues will not be fully resolved. The legal 
regimes narrow a dizzying array of potentially inchoate tensions to an 
apparently legitimate terrain upon which they become areas of contestation, 
rather than becoming solved, fixed, or permanently stabilized.  
 
